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Africanistan: An Afghanistan in France’s Backyard? 
American Graduate School in Paris  
Dominique Austin  
Abstract 
Since the advent of the global War on Terror, we have seen the growth and spread of many 
transnational terrorist networks to which the United States, backed by other major powers, has sought 
to eradicate. For the US., the major enemy was the Taliban and now ISIS. For France, Al Qaeda of the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which operates in North and West Africa, has had growing influence, 
especially in Mali, which recently faced a military coup and a civil war. In 2013, France launched a 
military operation in conjunction with the Malian government to topple AQIM forces in the north of 
the country. Despite the military success, the Al Qaeda group continues to be active and pose a serious 
threat to the region. In this context, the term “Africanistan” has been coined to create an analogy 
between the situation of Afghanistan under the Taliban and that of Africa more recently. This paper 
seeks to analyze what “Africanistan” means for France’s security in the context of rising global 
terrorism. Trans-Saharan states will be used as a case study in an analysis of French security issues as 
it relates to international migration stemming from AQIM. Expected findings are that “Africanistan” 
poses not only a security threat to France, in terms of international immigration, but a terrorist threat 
as well. 
 
Key words: Global terrorism, security, Africanistan, international migration, transnational terrorism.
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The emergence of the Global War on Terror following the September 11 terrorist attacks in the 
United States has changed how we see global security, with the US at the forefront.1  The attacks 
ushered in a new era of foreign policy for the US and put a renewed focus on terrorism worldwide. 
With the help of several allies, the US has attempted to combat transnational terrorist organizations 
like Al Qaeda and the Taliban first in Afghanistan and then later in Iraq.  The rise of numerous 
transnational terrorist organizations has raised questions about the security of states in a globalized 
world where borders can often be porous.  In recent years, immigration has become a more 
contentious issue because of the supposed links between immigration and terrorism.2  Most recently, 
US President Donald Trump’s travel ban (which focused on six Muslim majority countries), and 
issues over immigration and refugee policy in Europe sparked by the refugee crisis started by the 
Syrian Civil War, have caused much debate about the links between security, terrorism, and 
immigration. 
The Middle East has been at the center of the Global War on Terror. However, the spread of 
Islamist terrorism in Africa requires attention as well.  Al Qaeda has many branches, one of them 
being Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which operates mainly in Algeria, Mali, Tunisia, 
Niger, Libya, and Mauritania.3  The aims of AQIM are dismantling regional governments and 
spreading sharia law where it operates.4   
“Africanistan” is a term that denotes the rising security threat in the Sahara-Sahel region 
caused by a power vacuum similar to that created in Afghanistan by Soviet and then American 
invasions.  It is meant to show a grave similarity between Afghanistan after the Taliban insurgency 
and the Sahel after Islamist insurgency,  including factors such as drug and human trafficking, political 
turbulence, proliferation of weapons, suicide attacks and car bombings, as well as insurgency attacks.5  
The instability caused by this power vacuum has allowed terrorist groups such as AQIM, Jama'a 
Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin' (JNIM), and The Movement For Oneness and Jihad in West Africa 
(MOJWA) to thrive in the Sahel.  AQIM seeks to eradicate what it sees as a continued Western 
                                                 
1 Barry Buzan, “Will the Global War on Terror Be the New Cold War?,” International Affairs 82, No. 6 (November 2006). 
2 Valsamis Mitsilegas, “Immigration Control in the Era of Globalization: Deflecting Foreigners, Weakening Citizens, and Strengthening the State,” 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 19, No. 1 (Winter 2012). 
3“Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),” Counter Extremism Project, accessed August 1, 2017, https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/al-qaeda-
islamic-maghreb-aqim.   
4Ibid. 
5 David J. Francis, The Regional Impact of the Armed Conflict and French Intervention in Mali, (Oslo: NOREF, 2013). 
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presence in this region, specifically by France and Spain.6  Consequently, AQIM’s growing influence 
in Africa has been cause for concern for Europe.   
Scholars of the Africanistan literature are split into two camps, the first of which focuses on the 
security threat posed by having a highly volatile terrorist hub near one’s borders, and the second which 
focuses on the demographic issues pertaining to the mass migration caused by the terrorist presence.  
Consequently, this paper examines the implications of Africanistan and what it means for France in 
terms of security.  This is especially pertinent today, when states are implementing restrictive 
immigration policies and target certain countries or groups because of the fear that their populations 
produce terrorists.  In such situations, the security of the state is put above the security of individuals 
who are most likely fleeing persecution and violence from terrorist organizations.  This paper seeks to 
analyze and explain the security implications of immigration trends from failed states. 
 
Immigration and Security Post-Cold War/Securitization of Immigration  
 After the start of the Global War on Terror, international terrorism came to be seen as a 
“common threat.”7  The September 11 attacks brought forward some serious concerns about security 
in our new global order.  Liberalism and globalization were suddenly cause for concern because of the 
way that terrorists and other ill-minded people could use them to their advantage.  Thus, the relative 
success of the Global War on Terror came from the way that it tied together some long standing 
security concerns arising from the new liberal order.8  Borders, one of the most important aspects that 
constitute a state, were seen as impenetrable as states have complete control over their borders and 
thus the right to deny entry to anyone it does not see fit.  Globalization however, challenges this 
assumption by “questioning territorial borders and facilitating the movement of people [and goods] 
around the world.”9 Borders have become more porous with people, ideas, and technologies being able 
to travel more easily among states.  While this opening of state borders to trade, ideas, and peoples is 
generally to be promoted, such an opening also has a negative side wherein illiberal actors such as 
criminals and terrorists, “can take advantage of liberal openness in pursuit of illiberal ends.”10 This has 
led to some anxiety concerning cross border movement of weapons, drugs, and peoples.  
Consequently, states have developed a securitized approach to immigration which “links migration 
                                                 
6 The New York Times, “An Interview With Abdelmalek Droukdal,” The New York Times, published July 1, 2008 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01transcript-droukdal.html?mcubz=3. 
7 Buzan, “Will the Global War on Terror Be the New Cold War?,” 1104. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Mitsilegas, “Immigration Control in the Era of Globalization: Deflecting Foreigners, Weakening Citizens, and Strengthening the State,” 4. 
10 Buzan, “Will the Global War on Terror Be the New Cold War?,” 1104. 
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and movement to evils such as transnational organized crime and terrorism.”11  It was these issues 
surrounding immigration that led to the creation of the first multilateral convention which sought to 
develop global legal norms against the threat of transnational organized crime: The United Nations 
Convention on Transnational Organized Crime.12     
In addition to creating concerns about the merits of globalization and the liberal world order, 
the Global War on Terror served to create a cultural narrative wherein the “West,” seen as the pinnacle 
of liberal democratic values, was in a war against Islam (presented here as the antithesis of liberal 
democratic values).  Despite pushback from some Western leaders, this narrative has prevailed in 
many social and political discourses.13  Here we see the infamous “clash of civilizations” theory being 
promoted in the conception of the Global War on Terror and terrorism in general.  This theory has 
created a sense of fear concerning immigrants because it links culture and terrorism and consequently 
immigration and terrorism.  The role of foreigners and foreign networks in the September 11 attacks, 
as well as in attacks in London and Madrid, served to strengthen the tie between immigration and 
security.14  By tieing immigration to ideas of security and law and order, governments have been able 
to implement more restrictive immigration policies in the name of national security. 
This is a change from how security had been linked to immigration prior to the War on Terror. 
Security concerns about immigration post World War II were seen in a more traditional economic and 
cultural regard, and it wasn’t until after September 11 that security concerns about immigration 
became linked to physical and national security.15   
Following the September 11 attacks, the US and the EU worked together to combat the threat 
of transnational terrorism, which they agreed needed a global collective to fight it.  But despite 
collaboration in the field of counterterrorism, the EU and US have some differences.  Though both 
make the fight against terrorism a priority, they diverge in their methods. The EU made sure to 
emphasize improving relations with countries in the developing world financially and tactically to 
stem the incidence of terrorism.  This is in opposition to the US which tended to minimize this 
pathway and instead focus on carrying out a “tactical onslaught against the symptoms.”16  The EU has 
also made sure to work with the United Nations more so than the US.  Additionally, unlike the US, the 
                                                 
11 Mitsilegas, “Immigration Control in the Era of Globalization: Deflecting Foreigners, Weakening Citizens, and Strengthening the State,” 5. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Buzan, “Will the Global War on Terror Be the New Cold War?”  
14 Marie Courtemanche and Gallya Lahav, “The Ideological Threats of Framing Threat on Immigration and Civil Liberties,” Political Behavior 34, No. 3 
(September 2012).  
15 Ibid., p. 478-480. 
16 Jolyon Howorth, “European Security and Counterterrorism,” (Yale University, 2006), 6.   
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EU’s counterterrorism initiative put much more emphasis on addressing the root issues of terrorism, 
using long term strategies.17 
However, many scholars believe the link between immigration and security, and more 
specifically terrorism, is a weak one, which only serves to significantly increase the security apparatus 
of the state and hurt migrants and refugees.  They argue that the relationship between terrorism and 
migration is a complex one that cannot be simply reduced to “all migrants are terrorists”.18  While it is 
true that terrorist organizations can and do use immigration as a way to infiltrate states, the majority of 
migrants are in fact fleeing terrorist violence.19  
 
Philippe Errera of the French Foreign Ministry identifies three types of threat stemming from 
Islamist terrorism:  
1) The core members of the Al Qaeda network and its trained associates; 
2) Ethno-nationalist groups which share some of Al Qaeda’s ideology but have primarily local 
or national goals; 
3) “Freelance jihadists” [individuals or groups of individuals who should be considered 
“homegrown” terrorists].”20  
The last group is the one that poses an enormous problem at the moment, as many of the terrorist 
attacks that have recently been carried out in Europe have been by European nationals who were later 
radicalized.  This group does not fall under the category of “immigrant” as many have been natural 
born citizens of their respective European countries of residence.  This calls into question the validity 
of the securitization of migration and its effect on foreign and domestic policy of states.   
 
Failed States and Terrorism 
 Another security issue for states stems from the existence of failed and failing states, which are 
often hubs of terrorism that can easily have ramifications for neighboring and even far away states.  
The events of 9/11 only served to further strengthen the links made by academics and policy makers.  
Following 9/11, national security documents described failed states as “...safe havens for terrorists” 
and then US-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice claimed that the greatest threat to American security 
was failed and failing states.21  Failed states have two major challenges to their authority: their 
capacity to assert their authority over the entire domain of the state, and their ability to provide basic 
                                                 
17 Ibid.   
18 Alex P. Schmid, “Links Between Terrorism and Migration: An Exploration,” International Center for Counter-Terrorism (May 2016): 13. 
19 Ibid., p. 5. 
20 Oldrich Bures, EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger? (Surrey: Ashgate Press, 2011), 37. 
21 Piazza, “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?,” 469. 
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goods and services to its people.  The first issue allows for violent conflict to brew within a state’s 
borders and makes a country ripe for secessionist movements and civil wars. The second issue can 
lead to indigenous groups siding with non-state actors (i.e. terrorists) because these groups have the 
ability to provide what the state cannot or will not provide.22  
Why is there such a preponderance of terrorist organizations in failed and weak states and what 
allows them to thrive?  Firstly, failed and failing states can act as a host for terrorist networks which 
can take de facto control over territories within a state to use for training, shipment and transports of 
goods, or as a headquarters.23  This was the case with Mali, where until French intervention, AQIM 
had taken over the whole northern half of the country. The Sahara became a transit for drug 
trafficking, arms trafficking, and human trafficking because the Malian government was unable to 
control all of its territory.  Secondly, terrorist organizations have a bigger pool of recruits in failed 
states because the state is unable to adequately provide for its people in the way that is expected.24  
Consequently, these states have large populations which are struggling economically and socially, and 
which feel alienated by the state, which they see as corrupt. This large, disaffected population is easier 
to recruit and convince that violence against the state will address their grievances, or at least allow 
them to channel the frustration and anger they feel against their state.25  
Some critics argue, however, that failed states are not the perfect hubs for terrorists, who prefer 
failing or weak states to those that have completely collapsed.  Why are areas of state collapse not as 
attractive for terrorist groups as some scholars have argued?26  A complete lack of infrastructure and 
governance actually makes it harder to terrorist groups to operate because they have no infrastructure 
on which to build their organizations. In addition, failed states usually have the attention of stronger 
states, which might intervene since the state has collapsed.  This makes terrorist groups that 
congregate in failed states more susceptible to government intervention and thus annihilation (see the 
case of Mali).  Weak states, on the other hand, have some semblance of governance, autonomy, and 
sovereignty which actually gives these terrorist groups some safety as stronger states do not have the 
ultimate authority to invade or intervene in functioning states (even if weak or failing).   
The literature on failed and failing states and terrorism is somewhat divided over which types 
of states actually provide the perfect conditions for terrorist organizations to thrive. But there is 
                                                 
22 Ibid., p. 470. 
23 Nikolas Gvosdev and Ray Takeyh, “Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?,” The Washington Quarterly 25, No. 3 (Summer 2002): 98. 
24 Piazza, “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?,” 469. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ken Menkhaus, “Quasi-states, Nation-Building, and Terrorist Safe Havens,” The Journal of Conflict Studies 23, No. 2 (Fall 2003), 
https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/216/374. 
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consensus that failed and failing states do indeed contribute to transnational terrorism on a level not 
matched by fully functioning states.27    
 
An Afghanistan in France’s back yard 
 The idea of an “Africanistan” has largely been shaped by the policies of former US President 
George W. Bush.  The 9/11 attacks changed how Americans and the rest of the world envisioned 
safety and security in our globalized world.  Suddenly, border security and the idea of “smart borders” 
came to the forefront of legislation, where it might have not been a priority beforehand.28  In addition, 
immigration became an issue linked to the issues of border security and national security.  The Bush 
administration’s idea to go to war against Afghanistan in the hopes of defeating the Taliban has been, 
and continues to be, an unsuccessful foreign policy objective.  This policy, along with many others in 
the region, has allowed terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and the Taliban to continue to cause 
instability.  The failure of this invasion to curb terrorism, and the security problem it posed regionally 
and internationally, is a major point of comparison that the term Africanistan is trying to convey.  
Africanistan thus acts as a metaphor comparing the current day Sahel to Afghanistan post-invasion.  
The power vacuum left after the Soviet and American invasions allowed for the Taliban and then Al 
Qaeda to flourish in Afghanistan.  A similar instability has allowed Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb 
to flourish in the Sahel.  The rise of Salafism and implementation of sharia law, proliferation of drugs 
and arms, as well as kidnapping, are all cited as a basis for comparison between the two regions. But it 
is important to highlight that Africanistan is a metaphor for comparison and does not suggest that 
Afghanistan and the Sahel are identical; only that they have enough similarities to draw comparison. 
The term “Africanistan” is not only limited to being a metaphor between Africa and 
Afghanistan. Africanistan can also be used to show the similarities between Iraq and Syria29 as well as 
Libya.30 All of these countries hold examples of failed US foreign policy against transnational terrorist 
groups like Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and ISIS.  Instead of destroying the terrorist groups and bringing 
peace and stability, these groups have continued to survive and found refuge among the local 
populations.  The issues that arise from this phenomenon are destabilization of the area, mass 
migration, and border security.   
                                                 
27 Piazza, “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?,” 470. 
28 Mitsilegas, “Immigration Control in the Era of Globalization: Deflecting Foreigners, Weakening Citizens, and Strengthening the State.”  
29 Christopher S. Chivvis, The French War on Al Qa’ida in Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
30 Samuel Laurent, Sahelistan (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2013). 
The Journal of 
International Relations, Peace and Development Studies 
A publication by Arcadia University and the American Graduate School in Paris 
      
101, boulevard Raspail, 75006 Paris – France Tel: +33(0)1 47 20 00 94 – Fax: +33 (0)1 47 20 81 89 Website: www.ags.edu (Please cite this paper as the 
following: Dominique Austin (2018). Africanistan: An Afghanistan in France’s Backyard?.  The Journal of International Relations, Peace and 
Development Studies. Volume 4.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Page 8 
 
Scholars of the Africanistan theory fall into two groups. The first focuses on the traditional 
security threats posed by terrorism.  Laurent, Chivvis, and Barrera focus on the traditional security 
aspect of having a terrorist safe haven so close to France’s borders.  It was the Libyan revolution 
which led to the instability in the Sahel.  After the fall of Gaddafi, weapon and drug trafficking 
became prominent, and AQMI gained a large presence and power in the south, which spread 
throughout the rest of the region.31  One of the indicators of a fragile state, as defined by the Fragile 
State Index, is the weakening of the security apparatus wherein the state and its role as the provider of 
security is undermined by the emergence of competing groups (rebels, military officers, terrorists, 
etc.).32  The ability of AQIM to work with local populations adds more complexity to this issue.  Al 
Qaeda has shown that it has the ability to ally itself with local populations, who often feel oppressed 
by the state and do not trust that their issues will be solved by state cooperation.33  In Mali, Al Qaeda 
of the Islamic Maghreb used the longstanding grievances of the Tuaregs during the Tuareg rebellion to 
gain control of Northern Mali.  For scholars who focus on the traditional security threats posed by 
terrorism, Africanistan poses a major threat as it could potentially rival the Middle East as the center 
of global jihad.34 
The second group focuses on the migration issues of Africanistan, citing the high number of 
unemployed youths of francophone origin as a reason for worry for France.  Africa has, in addition to 
political turmoil, a large growing population with low levels of economic development as compared to 
Europe, thus increasing migration from Africa to Europe.35  According to Michailof, “Sub-Saharan 
Africa is a powder keg”.  The powder is demography and the detonator is the lack of employment (for 
many of these youths).”36  Massive unemployment among youth was one of the principal explanations 
for the collapse of Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq, along with the violence and political turmoil in these 
countries.  Northern Nigeria and its Boko Haram insurgency are an example of this phenomenon as 
well.  One of the main reasons Boko Haram was able to prosper was the high population density and 
low level of employment opportunities for youth.  These issues, in addition to other economic factors, 
served to incite the northern part of the country and made it easier for Boko Haram to infiltrate it. 
Terrorism and the chaos that comes with it led to its spread to countries like Mali and Chad as well.   
                                                 
31 Laurent, Sahelistan, 10. 
32 J. J. Mesner, ed., Fragile States Index 2016 - Annual Report, report, June 27, 2016, accessed August 20, 2017, 
http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/2016/06/27/fragile-states-index-2016-annual-report/. 
33 Christopher S. Chivvis, The French War on Al Qa’ida in Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
34 Ibid. 
35 Hans Hoebeke, Hans Merket, and Minke Meijnders, “The EU as a Security Actor in Africa,” Clingendael Monitor (December 2015). 
36 Serge Michailof, Africanistan: L'Afrique en crise va-t-elle se retrouver dans nos banlieues? (Paris: Fayard, 2015), 8. 
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Many of the countries of the Sahel plagued by terrorism and high unemployment are 
francophone.  Political turmoil and overall instability can cause refugee flows, which pose particular 
problems to the states that receive them.37  According to Michailof, many of the migrants are seeking 
to enter France, causing a demographic (and potential security) issue for the state.  For all of the 
authors, intervention is key in stopping the proliferation of transnational terrorism and the results of 
not acting will be grave.  
 
Methodology and Hypotheses  
 This paper tests the theory that failed and failing states are more likely to host agents of 
transnational terrorism, as well as the counter-theory that failed states are less likely to host 
transnational terrorists and terrorist groups than failing states.  In addition, this paper will test the 
theory that migrants from failed and failing states are not more likely to commit acts of terrorism than 
natural citizens of a country.  There are two hypotheses that will be considered in this analysis: 1) 
failing and failed states are more likely to be the source of transnational terrorist attacks that target 
other countries and 2) migrants from failing or failed states are not more likely to be agents of 
terrorism than natural citizens of a country.  This paper will choose to use Trans-Saharan states as a 
case study to test these hypotheses.  The Africanistan theory implies that the Trans-Saharan states 
(which are all failing or failed), because of their political and demographic instability, are becoming 
hubs of terrorism, while the failed state theory links failed and failing states with a preponderance of 
terrorism.  Thus, these two theories have been used to supplement each other in this analysis.  
I utilize the Fragile State Index data from 2016 to analyze the strength of the two theories 
presented in the literature.  The FSI creates a score for each state with higher scores signifying more 
instability and fragility while lower scores indicate more stability.  The scores are composed using 
data from 12 key social, economic, and political factors which is then amalgamated to create the final 
score which can range between 12 (the lowest amount of risk) and 120 (the highest risk).38  In addition 
to giving countries scores, they are also categorized by their level of strength or weakness.  States with 
a score between 60 and 89.9 are considered to be at the warning level which itself has additional 
rankings based on intensity (elevated and high).  Countries with a score between 90 and 120 are 
considered to be at the alert level again with additional rankings depending on variance of scores (high 
                                                 
37 Fiona B. Adamson, “Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security,” International Security 31, No. 1 (Summer 2006). 
38 “Methodology,” Fragile States Index, The Fund for Peace, accessed July 31, 2017 http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/methodology/. 
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and very high).  Countries with a score below 60 are considered to be stable or the highest level of the 
FSI which is sustainable.    
  Data from the Failed State Index will be coupled with data from the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD) which is a database that includes terrorist attacks around the world from 1970 to 
2016.  The GTD includes specific information on each attack including type of attack, the perpetrators, 
number of casualties, etc.  The GTD has three criteria for determining a terrorist attack: 
1) The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal. 
2) There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message 
to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.  
3) The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities, i.e. the act must be 
outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the 
admonition against deliberately targeting civilians or noncombatants).39 
Only terrorist attacks which meet all three criteria will be used in this analysis. Islamist 
terrorist attacks will be the type of terrorist attacks analyzed in this paper, either carried out by Islamist 
terrorist groups affiliated with Al Qaeda or ISIS who have their main base of operations or 
headquarters in Trans-Saharan states, or lone wolves.40  The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) is also 
utilized in this analysis.  The GTI combines factors associated with terrorist attacks to show the 
preponderance of terrorism relative to other countries around the world.  The GTI provides data on 
163 countries covering 99.7% of the world’s population.               
Attacks from 2007 to 2017 will be analyzed in this study.  Protocol questions will be made to 
better analyze and assert the claims of my initial hypothesis.  Each question will be derived from the 
academic literature and focuses on issues that are necessary to discern the security implications of 
Africanistan for France.  From the results gathered on the relation between immigration, failed or 
failing states, and terrorism, I will propose a foreign policy recommendation for France.  The protocol 
questions for this study will be divided by subtopic and are as follows:  
Status of migrant states 
● How many Trans-Saharan (TS) states are ranked as warning on the FSI? 
● How many TS states are ranked as alert on the FSI? 
 
Immigration 
● How many terrorist attacks have been carried out by migrants from TS states in France?  
                                                 
39 “Data Collection Methodology,” Global Terrorism Database, Accessed September 1, 2017 https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/using-gtd/. 
40 *AQIM, Algeria Province of the Islamic State, Ansar al-Dine, Ansar al-Sharia (Libya), Ansar al-Sharia (Tunisia), Barqa Province of the Islamic State, 
Fezzan Province of the Islamic State, Islamic State of the Greater Sahara, Jund al-Khilafa, MUJAO, Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade, and Tripoli Province of the 
Islamic State. 
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● How many Islamist terrorist attacks have been carried out in France in the 21st century? 
● How many Islamist terrorist attacks have been carried out in France by TS state nationals? 
● How many foreign fighters exist in France? 
● How many terrorist attacks have been carried out in France by French citizens? 
 
African Migration to Europe: Data 
As has been previously shown, there is a causal link between the fragility of a state and 
terrorism.  Many fragile states are overrun with social, economic, and political problems that allow for 
terrorism to manifest itself and counter the power of the state.  The Sahara-Sahel region of Africa has 
been an area of concern regarding terrorism because of the many issues plaguing it.  There are eight 
countries of the greater Sahara-Sahel region of Africa as defined by the OECD, including: Algeria, 
Morocco, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Tunisia, and Libya.  All of these countries are a part of the 
Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative created by the US to combat terrorism in Trans-Saharan 
Africa.41  More importantly, all of these countries are developing countries and have different levels of 
fragility as defined by the Fragile State Index.  Of the eight states, five (Libya, Mali, Chad, 
Mauritania, and Niger) are placed at the level of alert or higher, ranking between 95.2 and 110.1.42  
The remaining three countries (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) are marked as having an elevated warning, 
meaning they are close to being fragile or failed states with a range of 74.2 to 78.3 on the FSI.43  When 
we look at the FSI decade trends, which pool data from 2007 to 2016, we see that all of the Trans-
Saharan countries have been worsening, with only Morocco showing some marginal improvement 
(1.8 points).  Despite this marginal improvement, when we look at the 12 individual factors that 
influence a country’s overall FSI score, we see that Morocco scores very highly (i.e. poorly) in the 
areas of group grievance, human rights and rule of law, and human flight and brain drain.44  Chad and 
Algeria showed very low levels of worsening, moving down the FSI by 1.3 and 2.4 points 
respectively.45  Tunisia, Mauritania, and Niger has showed an average worsening trend, moving down 
the scale by 9.0, 8.7, and 7.2 points respectively.46  Libya and Mali, which both recently faced civil 
                                                 
41 “Borders in the Sahara-Sahel,” OECD, February 2015, http://www.oecd.org/swac/maps/16-borders.pdf. 
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wars as well as an expansion of terrorism, were ranked as critically worsening countries, moving down 
the scale by 27.1 and 19.7 points respectively.47 
 
Table 1. Comparison of indices of 8 states scoring high on the FSI with the Terrorism Index 
Country 2016 FSI Index 2016 Terrorism Index 
Algeria 78.3 4.282 
Morocco 74.2 .892 
Tunisia 74.6 4.963 
Chad 110.1 5.83 
Mali 95.2 6.03 
Niger 98.4 6.682 
Libya  96.4 7.283 
Mauritania 95.4 0.067 
 Source: Global Terrorism Index 2016; Fragile State Index 2016 
A comparison of state weakness with severity of terrorism seems to show a positive 
relationship between the two variables.  As the FSI index goes up, so does the preponderance of 
terrorism in most of the cases.  Morocco and Mauritania are outliers with a terrorism index of .892 and 
0.067 respectively despite their relatively high FSI score.  In addition, the level of fragility has a 
positive correlation with a country’s terrorism index, with countries at the “alert” level having a 
relatively higher terrorism index (5.83 - 7.283) than warning level countries (4.282 - 4.963).  It is 
important to note that Morocco and Mauritania are outliers.  The average terrorism index of the eight 
countries presented here is 4.5.  
What explains Morocco and Mauritania’s deviance from the general trend of failed states and a 
high preponderance of terrorism?  Following the 2011 Marrakech bombing in which 17 people were 
killed and the Arab Spring, Morocco increased its already tight control over its domestic population 
and worked to strengthen its security apparatus.  Furthermore, the country has “benefited from 
substantial European capacity-building assistance in operations and training” which has allowed for it 
to strengthen its counterterrorism measures and thus act as one of Europe’s key security partners in the 
                                                 
47 J. J. Mesner, ed., Fragile States Index 2016 - Annual Report, report, June 27, 2016, , accessed August 20, 2017, 
http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/2016/06/27/fragile-states-index-2016-annual-report/. 
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region.48  Like Morocco, Mauritania, has worked extensively with the EU to strengthen 
counterterrorism measures after the Arab Spring. However, another, perhaps more important factor in 
Mauritania’s low terrorism index, is its importance in passive jihadism.  Mauritania has a very strong 
appeal to jihadis because of its reputation for rigorous religious education and its perceived higher 
standard of authenticity.49 Consequently, there have not been many terrorist attacks in the country as 
many jihadis have been radicalized there or have gone there for education. 
 
Table 2. Comparison of indices of 8 states scoring low on the FSI with the Terrorism Index 
Country  FSI Index 2016 Terrorism Index 2016 
Finland  18.8 2.377 
Iceland 22.8 0.25 
Belgium 29.0 1.245 
Italy 43.1 2.363 
United Arab Emirates 44.5 0.422 
Japan 35.1 2.447 
UK 32.4 5.08 
Poland 40.7 0 
Source: Global Terrorism Index 2016; Fragile State Index 2016 
 Table 2. takes eight countries ranked stable or sustainable to analyze the relationship between 
strong countries and terrorism.  Five countries were randomly chosen from the stable category and 
three from the sustainable category to mimic the pool of countries used in the comparison of weak 
states.  Finland, Iceland, and Belgium are all sustainable states, while Italy, the United Arab Emirates, 
Japan, the UK, and Poland are stable countries.  The correlation between the FSI index and the 
Terrorism Index is less strong among this pool of countries.  The UK has a terrorism index of 5.08, 
well above the terrorism indices of the other stable and sustainable countries and more than double the 
terrorism index of Japan, the country with the next highest index. Poland and the UAE, which are 
among the lower ranked stable countries (though still with a very high FSI ranking), have the lowest 
                                                 
48 Anthony Dworkin and Fatim-Zohra El Malki, “The Southern Front Line: EU Counterterrorism Cooperation with Tunisia and Morocco,” Policy Brief, 
European Council on Foreign Relations (2018). 
49 Geoff D. Porter, “The Renewed Jihadi Terror Threat to Mauritania,” CTCSentinel 11, no 7, (August 2018): 18. 
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preponderance of terrorism, with Poland scoring a 0 on the Terrorism Index. With the exception of the 
UK, stronger states appear to have a lower preponderance of terrorism.  What explains the UK’s high 
Terrorism Index? In the past two years, OECD countries have experienced increased terrorist 
activity.50  The UK, Italy, and Belgium have all suffered multiple attacks with high casualties from 
ISIS, or ISIS inspired lone wolves.  Thus, these countries, which did not have a high preponderance of 
terrorism beforehand, had a sudden uptick in attacks and casualties that has caused their relatively high 
Terrorism indices.  The average terrorism index of the eight strong countries is 1.733.  Despite some 
variance, the data from Tables 1. and 2. seem to support the first hypothesis: that failing and failed 
states have a higher preponderance of terrorism than strong states. 
 
Table 3. Number of Migrants and Terrorists in France 
Country 2016 FSI Score Number of Migrants 
in France (2017) 
# of Terrorist Attacks 
Carried Out in France  
Algeria 78.3  1,450,00 1.5 
Chad 110.1  <10,000 0 
Libya 96.4 <10,000 0 
Mali 95.2 80,000 0 
Mauritania 95.4 20,000 0 
Morocco 74.2  940,000 1 
Niger 98.4 <10,000 0 
Tunisia  74.6  390,000 2 
Source: Global Terrorism Database 2016; Fragile State Index 2016; Pew Research Center 2018 
Table 4. Number of Terrorist Incidents Made by French Citizens 
Country FSI Score # of Foreign Fighters 
2016 
# of Terrorist Attacks 
Carried Out in France 
France 34.5 1,700 9.5 
Source: Richard Florida 2016; Fragile State Index 2016; Global Terrorism Database 2016 
                                                 
50  “Global Terrorism Index 2016,” Institute for Economics & Peace (2016). 
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Tables 3. and 4. Show how many times nationals of the eight Trans-Saharan countries in this 
study or French citizens participated in terrorist attacks in France.  A mark was given each time a 
terrorist attack was carried out in France by someone of a certain nationality. The April 2017 Champs-
Elysees attack which was carried out by 2 perpetrators (one of of French and one of Algerian 
nationality) was counted as ½ a point towards each group.  Table 3. shows the FSI index and the 
number of terrorist attacks carried out by nationals of each respective country. There were 3 terrorist 
attacks carried out whose nationality is unknown and who were thus, not included in the tables above.  
Out of all of the Trans-Saharan countries, attacks have been carried out by nationals of only three 
countries (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia).  Furthermore, each of these countries have a lower FSI 
index compared to the other Trans-Saharan countries and are all ranked in the “warning” group (as 
opposed to “alert”).  Algeria, which has the worst FSI index out of the three countries, had one attack 
carried out on French soil by an Algerian citizen. Morocco, despite marginally improving (it’s FSI 
index decreased by 1.8) had terrorist attacks committed in France by two of its nationals.51    
Table 4. Shows the number of terrorist attacks carried out by French citizens, as well as the 
number of foreign fighters (citizens who go to Syria or Iraq to fight and train with ISIS).  Despite 
France’s low FSI ranking, 9.5 terrorist attacks in France have been committed by French citizens in 
the past decade.  Between 2007 and 2017 there have been 1752 Islamist terrorist attacks carried out on 
French soil, all of which were carried out starting midway through the decade in 2012.  From the data 
we see a growing trend of Islamist related terrorist attacks throughout the years, with 11.8% of the 
attacks happening in 2012 and 2013 combined, 11.8% being carried out in 2014, 35.3% carried out in 
2015, 29.4% being carried out in 2016, and 11.7% being carried out in 2017.  It is important to note 
that 2017 data is potentially incomplete as it goes only as far as August of that year.  Thus, there is a 
possibility of more Islamist terrorist attacks happening in the year which would follow this positive 
growth trend.  When we break down the data by nationality, we see that 4.5 attacks were carried out 
by foreigners (26.5%) all of whom were citizens of TS countries.  9.5 attacks carried out were by 
French citizens making up 55.9% of the attacks in the past decade.  It is important to note however, 
that 7.5 of the 9.5 attacks were carried out by French citizens who were either second generation 
                                                 
51 J.J. Mesner, Fragile States Index 2016 - Annual Report, June 27, 2016.  Accessed August 20, 2017. http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/2016/06/27/fragile-
states-index-2016-annual-report/. 
52 Toulouse and Montauban shootings (2012), La Defense attack (2013), Tours Police Station Stabbing (2014), Dijon Vehicle Ramming (2014), Il-de-
France attack (2015), Nice Jewish Community stabbing (2015), Villejuif Church attack (2015), Saint-Quentin-Fallavier attack (2015), Thalys Train attack 
(2015), Valence Vehicle ramming (2016), Paris Police Station stabbing (2016), Magnanville stabbing (2016), Bastille Day attack (2016), Normandy 
Church attack (2016), Champs-Elysees attack (2017), Second Champs-Elysees attack (2017). 
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immigrants of TS or had TS origins.  Three of the total attacks carried out were by those of unknown 
origins making up 17.7% of the overall attacks. 
There are two important points that can be made from this data.  The first is that over a quarter 
of Islamist terrorist attacks in France have been carried out by foreigners (from fragile countries as 
defined by the FSI).  The second point is that French citizens also carried out more than half of all 
terrorist attacks committed in France and actually carried out twice as many attacks than foreigners.  
What does this tell us? Firstly, that the immigration (especially from fragile countries) does pose a 
security issue for France.  In the past 5 years, France has faced a preponderance of terrorist attacks 
with a very high intensity (with over 1,00053 casualties).  Many of the assailants came to France on 
various types of visas (tourist, student, etc.) or were long-term immigrants to the country.  The 
increase in people seeking to immigrate from the Global South to the North and specifically Europe, 
coupled with the increase in terrorist attacks, poses a serious threat to France’s national security.  The 
second point is perhaps the most surprising: a high number (more than half) of terrorist attacks carried 
out in France were in fact by French citizens.  This data supports the second hypothesis: that migrants 
from failed or failing states are not more likely to be agents of terrorism than natural citizens of a 
country.  
  What is interesting to note, however, is that the majority of attacks carried out by French 
citizens were by those of TS family origins (79%), usually a 2nd generation national.  This means that 
these terrorists were French citizens but had ethnic origins in foreign countries (the majority of which 
were TS countries).  Additionally, France is the European country with the second highest number of 
foreign fighters after Russia.  Thus, not only are most of the assailants of terrorist attacks in France 
French citizens but they are (mostly) ethnic minorities as well.  Additionally, many French citizens (of 
French ethnicity or foreign ethnicity) are traveling to Syria, Libya, and Iraq to train with Al Qaeda and 
ISIS.  These are not migrants, but French citizens who spent most if not all of their life in France.  
This brings up the question of why so many French citizens are committing acts of terrorism in their 
own country and what role does their ethnic background play in this phenomenon?   
 
Conclusion 
Failed and failing states are often believed to be hubs of terrorism and terrorist activity.  
Because of their lack of ability to assert their authority over their state and their lack of ability to 
                                                 
53 Global Terrorism Index 2013 – 2016. 
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provide basic goods to their citizens, these states have more terrorist activity happening in their 
countries on average than stable states.  The case study proved to be true in this assertion as on 
average the failed and failing states had a higher GTI, with the exception of Morocco and Mauritania.  
Despite these outliers, the 8 failing and failed states from the case study had on average a higher 
terrorism index than the 8 stable and sustainable states.  The fear of neighboring countries is that these 
countries will, in the worst case, implode, and the ramifications of their instability will spread and be 
felt by these stronger countries.  This was the case for Niger, which felt the ramifications of Boko 
Haram, a Nigerian based terrorist organization.  Mali and Libya, which both recently had civil wars, 
also have a very high GTI and their political instability explains this.  In fact, the Libyan Civil War 
and the toppling of Gaddafi accelerated the Malian Civil War by creating an influx of Islamist fighters 
into the country.  Thus, in two cases we have states feeling the ramifications of a high level of 
terrorism in a neighboring country.  Does this make France’s fears valid?  The majority of the 
countries studied are francophone and thus one could imagine not only a high number of refugees 
coming into the country but also terrorists sneaking into the country as immigrants or refugees.  
Menkhaus, argued that, in fact, failed states are not suitable for terrorist organizations because these 
states have complete lack of infrastructure and autonomy, which makes these groups more susceptible 
to the failures of the state as well as intervention from third parties.  However, the data did not support 
this theory as the weak states (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) had the lowest levels of terrorism, all 
falling below 5 with Morocco in fact having a GTI of .892. 
When we look at the number of Islamist terrorist attacks carried out by foreigners versus 
French (or European) citizens, French citizens have committed more than twice as many attacks in the 
past decade.  However, when we compare these numbers (number of attacks carried out) to the 
number of migrants and number of French citizens in the country, migrants have a higher 
preponderance of committing terrorist attacks (as there is a much lower number of migrants in the 
country than citizens).  Does international migration pose a security implication for states that are on 
the receiving end? Yes, more than a quarter of the Islamist terrorist attacks carried out in France in the 
past decade have been by migrants, with almost all being from the case study countries.  However, the 
status of migrants should not be securitized to such an extent and over-sensationalized because they, in 
fact, carry out fewer attacks than French citizens.  Furthermore, it is a very small percentage of 
migrants who actually carry out attacks: less than 1 per cent of the number of migrants from each TS 
country in the past decade. In France, the majority of attacks were in fact carried out by French 
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citizens.  However, it is important to note that a majority of the French citizens who carried out attacks 
were of TS origins, meaning their parents or grandparents were from those countries or that their 
ethnicity is of that country.  This aspect of the study adds more to the Africanistan literature, as these 
attackers are the children of migrants or children of foreign ethnic origins not fully integrating into 
French society.  
 What does this mean for France exactly? Is Africanistan a threat? From the research 
conducted, the Africanistan literature seems to be supported. However, it is important to note that, as 
of now, the sample size (total number of Islamist attacks) is relatively low (with only 17 attacks 
having been carried out between 2007 and 2017).  As the Global War on Terror continues, there are 
bound to be more Islamist attacks carried out in France.  Further research should be done in the near 
future in order to give more weight to the data collected. However, as of now, these numbers are of 
grave importance as policy makers scramble to understand the profiles of terrorists, which can have 
major domestic and foreign policy implications for not only France but the rest of Europe as well. 
Although one of the arguments in this study was that migrants do not have a higher preponderance of 
being terrorists than citizens, it was not meant deny the possible danger that migrants can pose in the 
era of global terrorism.  While France needs to continue to vet its migrants however, it also needs to 
put more focus on how its own citizens are becoming radicalized in France or going to Syria and Iraq 
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